Alderman explores this change through the eyes of Roxy, the daughter of a British drug baron; Margot, mayor of an unnamed city in the United States; Allie, a brown girl in an abusive foster home in Alabama; and Tunde, a young Nigerian journalist. All their perspectives converge on the newly declared nation of Bessapara, previously Moldova, where the former sex-trafficking capital of the world becomes a staging ground for the new world order. I was riveted by every page.
In the game Margot played when she was a child, she was enough all by herself. I played those games too. I imagined that power whenever I sat with teeth gritted through rape scenes in movies and books, and deflected the horror on screen into the fantasy of men stopped by the power I could summon. I felt so hungry, reading this book, for a ball of lightning in my hand instead of keys between my knuckles on a long walk home at night. I felt hungry for the victory of these women — two of whom are raped in their first scene — over those who would hurt them.
They are related to each other; they shed light on and complicate each other. But something tense dances between them like electricity arcing from palm to palm. The need to take a direct part in spiritual life, in the work of salvation, in the truth which lies in the Book —all that was a struggle for a new subjectivity.
I know what objections can be made. We can say that all types of subjection are derived phenomena, that they are merely the consequences of other economic and social processes: forces of production, class struggle, and ideological structures which determine the form of subjectivity. It is certain that the mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the mechanisms of exploitation and domination. They entertain complex and circular relations with other forms.
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The reason this kind of struggle tends to prevail in our society is due to the fact that, since the sixteenth century, a new political form of power has been continuously developing. This new political structure, as everybody knows, is the state. But most of the time, the state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens. Never, I think, in the history of human societies —even in the old Chinese society— has there been such a tricky combination in the same political structures of individualization techniques and of totalization procedures.
This is due to the fact that the modern Western state has integrated in a new political shape an old power technique which originated in Christian institutions. We can call this power technique the pastoral power. First of all, a few words about this pastoral power.
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It has often been said that Christianity brought into being a code of ethics fundamentally different from that of the ancient world. Less emphasis is usually placed on the fact that it proposed and spread new power relations throughout the ancient world. Christianity is the only religion which has organized itself as a church. And as such, it postulates in principle that certain individuals can, by their religious quality, serve others not as princes, magistrates, prophets, fortune-tellers, benefactors, educationalists, and so on but as pastors.
However, this word designates a very special form of power. This form of power is salvation oriented as opposed to political power. It is oblative as opposed to the principle of sovereignty ; it is individualizing as opposed to legal power ; it is coextensive and continuous with life; it is linked with a production of truth —the truth of the individual himself. This is true, but I think we should distinguish between two aspects of pastoral power —between the ecclesiastical institutionalization, which has ceased or at least lost its vitality since the eighteenth century, and its function, which has spread and multiplied outside the ecclesiastical institution.
An important phenomenon took place around the eighteenth century —it was a new distribution, a new organization of this kind of individualizing power. In a way, we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization or a new form of pastoral power. A few more words about this new pastoral power.
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At the end of the eighteenth century, Kant wrote, in a German newspaper —the Berliner Monatschrift — a short text. What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living?
Or in other words: What are we? Compare this with the Cartesian question: Who am I? I, as a unique but universal and unhistorical subject? I, for Descartes, is everyone, anywhere at any moment. But Kant asks something else: What are we? I think that this aspect of philosophy took on more and more importance.
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But the task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain of all philosophical problems is the problem of the present time and of what we are in this very moment. Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.
It would make this power a mysterious substance which they might hesitate to interrogate in itself, no doubt because they would prefer not to call it into question. But does not their very distrust indicate a presupposition that power is something which exists with three distinct qualities: its origin, its basic nature, and its manifestations? The little question, What happens? For let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others.
It is necessary also to distinguish power relations from relationships of communication which transmit information by means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium.
The Subject and Power
No doubt communicating is always a certain way of acting upon another person or persons. But the production and circulation of elements of meaning can have as their objective or as their consequence certain results in the realm of power; the latter are not simply an aspect of the former. Power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capacities should not therefore be confused. This is not to say that there is a question of three separate domains. It is a question of three types of relationships which in fact always overlap one another, support one another reciprocally, and use each other mutually as means to an end.
The application of objective capacities in their most elementary forms implies relationships of communication whether in the form of previously acquired information or of shared work ; it is tied also to power relations whether they consist of obligatory tasks, of gestures imposed by tradition or apprenticeship, of subdivisions and the more or less obligatory distribution of labor.
Of course, the coordination between these three types of relationships is neither uniform nor constant. What is to be understood by the disciplining of societies in Europe since the eighteenth century is not, of course, that the individuals who are part of them become more and more obedient, nor that they set about assembling in barracks, schools, or prisons; rather, that an increasingly better invigilated process of adjustment has been sought after —more and more rational and economic —between productive activities, resources of communication, and the play of power relations.
It is to give oneself as the object of analysis power relations and not power itself —power relations which are distinct from objective abilities as well as from relations of communication. This is as much as saying that power relations can be grasped in the diversity of their logical sequence, their abilities, and their interrelationships.
The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Which is to say, of course, that something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. This also means that power is not a function of consent. In itself it is not a renunciation of freedom, a transference of rights, the power of each and all delegated to a few which does not prevent the possibility that consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance of power ; the relationship of power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus.
Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future. A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities.
Its opposite pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other option but to try to minimize it. Obviously the bringing into play of power relations does not exclude the use of violence any more than it does the obtaining of consent; no doubt the exercise of power can never do without one or the other, often both at the same time. But even though consensus and violence are the instruments or the results, they do not constitute the principle or the basic nature of power.
The exercise of power can produce as much acceptance as may be wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it can imagine.
In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly, is renewable. A set of actions upon other actions. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government.
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This word must be allowed the very broad meaning which it had in the sixteenth century. It did not only cover the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible held of action of others. The relationship proper to power would not, therefore, be sought on the side of violence or of struggle, nor on that of voluntary linking all of which can, at best, only be the instruments of power , but rather in the area of the singular mode of action, neither warlike nor juridical, which is government.
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a held of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized. Where the determining factors saturate the whole, there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains. In this case it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint. Consequently, there is no face-to-face confrontation of power and freedom, which are mutually exclusive freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised , but a much more complicated interplay.
In this game freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude how could we seek to be slaves? At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.